



# How safe do we need to be?

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# How much «safety» is enough?



## The absence of accidents

(see e.g. Tench, 1985; Hollnagel, 2014; Leveson, 2016)


## Acceptable risk

(see e.g. Lowrance, 1976; Rausand, 2011; Aven et al., 2015)

Safety is related to the amount of risk we are willing to accept and, ultimately, risk acceptance is a societal problem.

Different stakeholders may have different perspectives:

- Regulators and authorities
- Owners and operators
- The public



IMO FSA guidelines (2018)



# How much «safety» is enough?



Perceived safety is one of the most significant concerns and is inversely proportional to autonomy levels!

*Survey for autonomous urban ferries*

*(Goerlandt and Pulsifer, 2022)*



“Impact of automation to the tugboat industry” survey (2022)

Would you trust and feel safe onboard a fully autonomous tugboat?

90% would moderately trust the system or not at all

How would you make the autonomous operation of the "tugboat swarm" more efficient in realistic conditions?

“There should be a crew of *at least two people onboard*”

“More emphasis should be placed on safety and *emergency cases*”

# How safe do we think we need to be?

Since we don't want to end up with a worse situation...

Autonomous ships need to be **at least as** safe  
as conventional, manned ships

(see, e.g., Jalonen, 2017)

This is just to get things started but...

**Is the current safety level acceptable?  
Should the maritime transport system not get safer?**





# How much safety do we expect?

We have **X number of accidents** now,  
autonomous ships will **reduce accidents by Y%** due to [...],  
therefore with autonomous ships we will have **Z number of accidents**.

**58%** (EMSA, 2018) to **75%** (Allianz, 2017) of marine accidents are caused by human error.

Assuming that:

- 1) lost lives will be reduced due to less crew onboard,
- 2) autonomous ships will reduce navigation-related accidents

de Vos et al. (2021) support that the largest benefit is from reducing the risk exposure of humans.

Scenario	Impact (lives lost)	Max Impact (nav. accidents)
Small (< 120m) cargo ships unmanned	-47.4%	-14.2% ships lost -12.8% lives lost
All cargo ships unmanned	-69.5%	-20.8% ships lost -15.7% lives lost



Autonomous ships  
will need to be SAFER  
than conventional ships

# Why do we need to be safer?



Making autonomous ships safer would also make them more attractive to stakeholders!

**COST**

Potentially higher **generalized costs** (e.g. advanced automation, shore control centres, less personnel but more expensive, loss of reputation in case of an accident)

**UNCERTAIN**

**BENEFIT**

**Generalized benefits** should also increase (incl. SAFETY)

**PARADOX:**

Why are we expecting so much more from automation than what we expect from humans?



# What will it take to be safer?

## Address the uncertainties

- Will reduced or eliminated risks be outweighed by **new risks introduced by automation** (Porathe et al., 2018; Ventikos and Louzis 2019)?
- How much will not having the **mitigative potential** of the human element affect the overall safety level?
  - In an implementation of STPA on a theoretical autonomous ship, we identified **less measures for “mitigating the consequences”** with higher autonomy (Ventikos et al., 2020)
- How can we convincingly **verify and validate** the expected safety level (digital twins?)
- Address **system fragility** potentially introduced by ultra-efficient automation





# What will it take to be safer?

Choose a strategy

## Option 1: Humans stay in the loop

**Constrained autonomy** – the ship solves all “standard” problems, an operator solves the complex problems (Porathe et al., 2018)

The logo for MOSES, featuring the word "MOSES" in a bold, blue, sans-serif font. The letter "O" is replaced by a teal circle with a white outline.

STPA for the MOSES autonomous tugboat swarm operation:  
for most identified loss scenarios, **remote-control or direct control from a tugboat captain** was considered the most appropriate action to get to a Minimum Risk Condition (MRC)

## Option 2: Autonomous ships become more “autonomous”

Deal with a lot more different situations on their own (depends on autonomy level)



# Another way to look at safety?

We cannot only rely on trying to identify scenarios for accidents that have not yet happened!


## Bio-inspired safety

What if, by knowing what is “normal”, the autonomous ship could understand what is “abnormal”?


- An autonomous ship can be viewed as an “organism” with integrated processes for regulating its “health”.
- Our research at NTUA is trying to implement this perspective for risk assessment in the different ship life-cycle phases.

Ventikos, N.P., Louzis, K., 2019. Introducing a bio-inspired Life-Cycle Framework for emerging risks in the maritime industry. Sustainable Development and Innovations in Marine Technologies: Proceedings of the 18th International Congress of the Maritime Association of the Mediterranean (IMAM 2019). Varna, Bulgaria. CRC Press, pp 527 - 536.

Possible System States



Normal operation  
“Abnormal” states





Thank you

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